BASICS 2026 New Year Seminar
| 时间 | 讲者 | 报告题目 |
|---|---|---|
| 上午 Morning Session | ||
| 10:00 - 10:40 | 傅育熙 | On the Shortest Paths in 2-VASSes |
| 10:40 - 11:20 | 陶表帅 | Likelihood of the Existence of Average Justified Representation |
| 11:20 - 12:00 | 刘思学 | Sublinear Algorithms for Graph Optimization |
| 12:00 - 13:30 午餐休息 Lunch Break | ||
| 下午 Afternoon Session | ||
| 13:30 - 14:10 | 张宇昊 | Online Scheduling Problems |
| 14:10 - 14:50 | 尹强 | 基于路径的图查询基数估计框架 |
| 14:50 - 15:30 | 郑扬珞 | Geometrically 2-Dimensional Vector Addition Systems |
| 15:30 - 15:40 茶歇 Tea Break | ||
| 15:40 - 16:20 | 汪宇霆 | 系统软件模块化验证方法的一些探索 |
| 16:20 - 17:00 | 杨宽 | Towards a Sampling/counting Satisfiability Conjecture |
| 17:00 - 17:40 | 陈翌佳 | Understanding Uncolored CFI-graphs |
We study the approval-based multi-winner election problem where \(n\) voters jointly decide a committee of \(k\) winners from \(m\) candidates. We focus on the axiom \(\text{average justified representation}\) (AJR) proposed by Fernandez et al. (2017). AJR postulates that every group of voters with a common preference should be sufficiently represented in that their average satisfaction should be no less than their Hare quota.
Formally, for every group of \(\lceil \ell \cdot \frac{n}{k} \rceil\) voters with \(\ell\) common approved candidates, the average number of approved winners for this group should be at least \(\ell\). It is well-known that a winning committee satisfying AJR is not guaranteed to exist for all multi-winner election instances.
In this paper, we study the likelihood of the existence of AJR under the Erdős--Rényi model. We consider the Erdős--Rényi model parameterized by \(p \in [0,1]\) that samples instances where each voter approves each candidate with probability \(p\). We provide a clean and complete characterization of the existence of AJR committees in the case where \(m\) is a constant and \(n\) tends to infinity. We show that there are two phase transition points \(p_1\) and \(p_2\) (with \(p_1 \le p_2\)) for the parameter \(p\).